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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(h)ofthe Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and misapply the law when it gave

petitioner a substantially greater portion of the marital property without there being a
finding of unusual circumstances justifying the same.
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and misapply the law by ordering

respondent to pay alimony in an amount far and in excess of his ability to pay.
III.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and misapply the law by ordering

respondent to pay petitioner's attorney fees when there was no finding of fact nor
evidence that respondent had the ability to pay.
IV.

The standard of appellate review is correction of abusive discretion, (Hall v. Hall

858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999), Munns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990), and Shinokoskev v. Shinkoskev. 19 P.3d
1005 (Utah App. 2001)); and correction of error, Elman v. Elman. 45 P.3d 176 (Utah
App. 2002), (Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, (Utah 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-3 and 30-3-5(7).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. A Petition for Divorce was filed January 28, 2002 in the Sixth Judicial District
Court of Sevier County.
1

2. Trial of the matter was held on November 7, 2002.
3. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered
January 6, 2003. (Copies are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively).
4. Respondent filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Decree of Divorce January
10,2003.
5. An Order Denying respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend Decree of Divorce
was entered January 29, 2003.
6. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal February 24, 2003fromafinalOrder
entered by the Sixth District Court, Sevier County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set forth below are those found by the trial court in its Findings of Fact
(see Exhibit "A"):
a. The marriage between the parties is long term, having been married on
November 27, 1976, in the City of Bountiful, State of Utah.
b. The respondent's extramarital affair and abusive behavior have caused
difficulties in the marriage that cannot be reconciled and have prevented the parties from
pursuing a viable marriage relationship. The petitioner should be granted a divorce from
the respondent, effective today.
c. The parties' children have all reached their majority or have otherwise become
emancipated.
d. The appraised value of the marital home was $103,500 which includes some,
but not all of, the reasonable and necessary repairs. The appraiser, Mr. Stott, deducted
2

$3,500 for these repairs. Mr. Thomas, a licensed contractor, testified that there was
indeed $5,448 in estimated repairs. The Courtfindsthat an additional $2,000 should be
deducted from the appraised value of the home for these reasonable and necessary
repairs, bringing the actual value of the marital home to be $101,500.
e. The Syndicut has been the business of the petitioner's during the marriage. If
appears to the Court that the petitioner has given as low a value as possible and the
respondent has given as high a value as possible to the assets of the business. The
petitioner testified the value to be $4,558.50. The respondent testified the value to be
$9,340.00. The Court finds that the business is not worth either of the two values. The
1999 tax returns shows a loss of $4,970 and the 2000 tax return shows a loss of $13,901.
The business is clearly a losing venture and the losses clearly exceed any value. The
business should be liquidated. However, the Court is not going to order it to be sold
because it is a source of income to the petitioner and the Court awards the business to her
with no interest in the respondent.
f. The Court wants to divorce these parties and make it so they have as little to do
with each other in regards to the marital assets as possible. For that reason, the Court has
lumped the petitioner's savings account issue, the business checking account issue, and
the division of proceeds from the mountain property sale together and finds the following
to be a reasonable and fair division of those accounts:
i. The parties borrowed from their daughters', Ashley and Kacy's, savings
accounts during the marriage to buy stock. Those debts have been repaid with funds
from the home equity loan. The petitioner didn't like the purchase of stock with
3

borrowed money, but she went along with it anyway. The Courtfindsthat the debt to
buy stock from the home equity loan is a marital debt.
ii. The petitioner has a savings account at Mountain America Credit Union
with a balance of $11,000. The Courtfindsthe petitioner's testimony to be credible as to
the source of those funds; $4,500 was transferred from her business account to pay for a
tanning bed, $3,000 was deposited over the months for Kacy and which does belong to
Kacy. The remaining $3,500 camefrompetitioner's checking account. The petitioner
has now paid Kacy her $3,000fromthe account. The petitioner has a credit card debt of
$5,700 incurred for the most part to purchase the tanning bed for $4,500. The remaining
net to the petitioner from the savings account is $2,300 which should be awarded to her
free and clear of any interest in the respondent.
iii. The parties sold some mountain property and the respondent received
$11,000 from the sale proceeds and the petitioner received $4,000, which shorts her
$3,500froman equitable split.
iv. The petitioner has a balance of $7,234 in her business account as of
October 31, 2002. In reviewing the checking account activity, the account balance truly
does fluctuate with a range in 2002 from a low of $1,616 in February to a high of $7,559
in June. The petitioner has testified that the account is used to pay ongoing business
expenses and supplies, to pay her quarterly income taxes, and to pay her FICA for her
employees. The Courtfindsher testimony credible and it seems to the Court that these
are legitimate business expenses and if she didn't accumulate the large balances, that she
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would have to have a line of credit with a lending institution to meet these ongoing
business expenses.
g. Based on the foregoing, the Court then awards the respondent the $3,500
difference from the sale of the mountain property, but awards the petitioner the $2,300 as
an off-set from the savings account. The petitioner is awarded all the assets of the
Syndicut and business savings account balance. The Court specifically finds that such
division is fair and reasonable and equitable.
h. In regards to the other personal property of the parties, neither party wanted
certain items, to-wit: two (2) large gray boxes with dishes, rifle scope and case, Ruger
with scope, air mattresses, chairs, sleeping bags, compound bow, hand-made fly rods,
Ruger rifle, 33" deer mount, Savage shotgun combination, elk mount, deer mount
(velvet), moose hide, bear rug, deer mounted, antelope mount, Englewood pole, Coleman
stove, knife collection, 4-wheeler trailer, 4-wheeler and plow, braided rug, one (1) burner
stove, two (2) large coolers, TeePee, Camp Chef, sheepherder stove, Coleman lantern,
Ruger 1022, Ruger .06, Remington 32 Special, and camping equipment. The Court
orders that these items should be sold now, no matter whose possession they are in and an
accounting be provided to the other party, including proof of the sales price and
purchaser. The parties should split the sales proceeds evenly. If the respondent wants
any of the items, then he shall be obligated to pay the petitioner the value she has listed
on her Exhibit No. 5 because the Court finds her values to be more reasonable.
i. The petitioner should be awarded all of the items of personal property on her
Exhibit No. 3, except the big screen tv and the entertainment center, which should be
5

awarded to the respondent. The respondent should be awarded the remaining items on
petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, except for those items listed above.
j . All remaining personal items should be awarded to the party that currently has
them in their possession.
k. The 5th wheel trailer should remain in the care of the respondent and he is
responsible for all debt associated therewith. The respondent should be ordered to sale
the trailer, retire the debt, and apply all net proceeds towards the home equity debt. The
trailer should be sold as soon as possible for as much as it can possibly bring.
1. The respondent should be awarded the new Ford diesel 4x4 pickup, together
with all debt associated therewith. The Court specifically fmds that at best, the purchase
was foolish, but the Court is of the opinion that the respondent incurred this debt for the
intentional purpose to gain an advantage in these divorce proceedings and lower his net
income available for alimony purposes. The truck should be sold immediately and all net
equity applied towards the home equity loan. If there is a deficiency after the sale, the
respondent is solely responsible for the debt and he should hold the petitioner harmless
therefrom.
m. After the respondent has retired the debtsfromthe 5th wheel trailer and the
Ford diesel truck, the parties are left with $19,000 on the home equity loan. The Court
specifically finds that this $19,000 debt is a marital obligation and should be equally
shared by the parties. The payment is $300 per month and each party is ordered to pay
$150 per month until the debt is paid in full. Either party can pay their share of $9,500 in
advance, but neither party is to use the home equity line of creditfromhere on.
6

n. The petitioner is awarded the home and real property with the only
encumbrance being the $19,000 home equity loan. The respondent should quit claim his
interest in the home immediately to the petitioner.
o. The respondent should be awarded a larger portion of his 40 IK and receive his
portion of the home equity from those proceeds calculated as follows:
(1) Each party has $50,750 of equity in the marital home after the $19,000
home equity loan is paid. The respondent should receive the first $60,250fromhis 40IK
and the remaining balance split 50/50 between the parties. Said sum is the respondent's
portion of his equity in the marital home.
p. If for any reason, including bankruptcy, the respondent fails to pay his portion
of the home equity loan, then the petitioner is awarded that portion not paidfromthe
respondent's 40IK and the petitioner should be allowed to come back before the Court to
modify this provision and change the distribution of the 40 IK. This division and order is
meant to be bankruptcy proof. The petitioner is awarded the home and all the equity and
the respondent is awarded the larger portion of his 40IK so long as he satisfied his
portion of the home equity loan.
q. The petitioner is awarded a portion of the respondent's other retirement,
pension, or profit sharing plansfromhis place of employment and should be split
pursuant to the Woodward formula. The respondent should prepare qualified domestic
relation orders consistent with these findings.
r. In regards to the parties' incomes, it is undisputed that the petitioner earns
$1,100 per month. The petitioner has testified that she has $2,092 in monthly expenses
7

and the respondent has suggested that some of the figures are inflated. However, it
appears to the Court that the petitioner has in fact minimized her expenses on every
account and the Court specifically finds $2,092 to be reasonable monthly needs of the
petitioner. The Court has further ordered her to pay $150 per month towards the home
equity loan which she didn't expect.
s. In order to help the petitioner attain the same standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage, the Courtfindsthat she needs at least $992 per month over and
above her income. It is unrefuted that during the marriage, money worries were nonexistent for the petitioner. Since the separation, the petitioner has been scrimping and
saving in order to exist, which she shouldn't have to do. The petitioner is in need of at
least $992 to attain the same standard of living.
t. The respondent grosses $5,387 per month and after taxes, the Courtfindshis net
monthly income to be $3,631. The respondent has listed monthly expenses, two (2) of
which the Court finds are clearly excessive and unreasonable. The first is the truck
payment of $743 per month. The Court has previously found that the respondent
incurred this expense in order to avoid paying alimony. The second unreasonable
expense is the $618 per month 40IK loan payment which is clearly excessive. At that
rate of payment, the loan would be paid off in a very short period of time. Extrapolating
the respondent' analysis and suggestion of how the petitioner could borrow funds to pay
the respondent's claimed equity from the home, the Court believes $120 per month is a
more reasonable payment and is in line with the respondent's suggested analysis. There
is also a clear question in the Court's mind as to the real monthly payment owed on the
8

40IK loan as the documents presented by the respondent suggest several figures.
Consequently, the Court finds that the $120 payment on the 40IK loan is a reasonable
sum. The respondent is ordered to assume and hold the petitioner harmless from the
40IK loan.
u. The respondent has incurred substantial credit card debt since the parties9
separation. The respondent has suggested that he is responsible for that debt and the
Court does order that he should pay that debt and hold the petitioner harmless therefrom.
v. After the respondent has sold the 5th wheel trailer and retired the debt, the Court
finds that the respondent has reasonable and necessary monthly expenses of $2,911
which includes the credit card payment. The Court reaches said sum using the following
calculations: $4,002 less $743 auto payment, less $498 40IK loan payment, and less
$150 home equity loan payment. These expenses are taken from respondent's Exhibit
No. 18 under the heading after 5th wheel sold. Subtracting the reasonable expenses from
the respondent's take home pay leaves $720 that he can pay towards alimony for the
petitioner to help her monthly needs.
w. From the foregoing, the Court finds that $720 per month for alimony is a
reasonable amount which should be paid each month for the length of the marriage unless
terminated earlier by remarriage or cohabitation. The respondent should pay 2/3's of this
amount immediately, which represents the balance owed for the remainder of this month.
x. At the time of trial, petitioner's business had no major debts other than that
owing for the tanning bed in the amount of $3,500 (testimony of Sindy Holmstead in the
record).
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y. At the time of trial, the balance owing on the home equity loan was
approximately $50,300 of which $28,425 was borrowed for the 5th wheel and the
remainder was joint obligation debt (testimony of respondent in the record).
z. At the time of trial, the balance owing on the home equity loan was
approximately $50,300 of which $28,425 was borrowed for the 5th wheel and the
remainder was joint obligation debt (testimony of respondent in the record).
aa. At the time of trial, the 40 IK loan balance was approximately $19,000
(testimony of respondent in the record).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Inequitable division of marital property. Generally each of the parties is
entitled to one-half of the marital property unless the court finds exceptional
circumstances supporting an unequal distribution. The trial court unequally divided the
value of the marital home and retirement accounts, either because of a mathematical error
or without properly finding that there were exceptional circumstances that warranted the
unequal division of this property. The trial court's language clearly indicates that it had
intended to divide this property equally, but its findings and order failed to do so.
The petitioner's business assets were also unequally divided without exceptional
circumstances being found. Assets with value in excess of $11,000.00 were awarded
exclusively to petitioner without any division on the basis that the trial court believed the
"losses exceeded value". Its findings were inconsistent with the evidence and testimony
and not supported by any exceptional circumstance.
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2. Award of alimony in excess of ability to pay. Without any evidence or
testimony to support a finding that respondent could lower his 40IK loan payment by
$498.00 per month, the trial court eliminated this much of respondent's debt obligation
thereby increasing his available net monthly income artificially. All of the testimony and
evidence presented at trial supported a finding that respondent could not lower this
particular debt and despite what the trial court extrapolated as an amount that this loan
payment could be reduced to, the reality was that respondent still was obligated to pay the
full amount of the loan and did not have the funds imagined by the trial court to pay the
amount of alimony ordered.
3. Award of attorney fees in absence of respondent's ability to pay. Before
requiring a party to pay attorney's fees, a trial court must find that that party has the
ability to pay them. Not only did the trial court not make such a finding, but in light of
the fact that it required respondent to pay more money than he had as alimony certainly
left him without any additional monthly income or other source of funds with which to
pay petitioner's attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
A. Inequitable Division of Marital Property.
"Generally in a divorce proceeding, each party is presumed to be entitled to all of
his or her separate property and 50% of the marital property." Bradford v. Bradford, 993
P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999), (see also Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993)).
"An unequal division of marital property, however, is only justified when the Court
memorializes in commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstances
11

supporting the distribution." Bradford v. Bradford, ibid (see also Thomas v. Thomas, 987
P.2d 603 (Utah App. 1999), Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), and Burt v.
Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990)).
In the present case, the trial court made an unequal award of marital property with
respect to its division of the marital home and respondent's retirement accounts.
Respondent believes that the trial court intended to divide the value of the marital home
and the retirement accounts equally, but made a mathematical error in calculating the
division. When issuing its ruling regarding the home and the retirement, the trial court
stated:
"Now, the house and the 401-K are going to be combined for purposes of
getting you two ultimately divorced. The 401-K loan amount is going to be
divided as well First of all, the house is awarded to petitioner, okay, and
the 401-K account is going to be divided, and I am going to go through
how.
I am finding that the $19,000.00 debt - that's the loan on the 401-K account
— was a marital obligation. Each one consequently owed $9,500.00 of the
$19,000.00. The respondent will receive his portion of the house's equity
by taking a larger portion of the 401-K asset.
The equity in the house, it - and this is where it gets complicated. Once the
home equity loan is paid, then there is no obligation on this house, and both
parties co-own it 50/50. Then each would be entitled to $50,750.00.
The respondent is awarded the first $50,750.00 of his 401-K. In addition to
that, he's awarded $9,500.00 more dollars, which is petitioner's portion of
the debt that was borrowed from the 401-K. So he would get the first
$60,250.00 of the 401-K money. The balance is split 50/50, and the
computation is done as of today." (See Trial Transcript, page 214, lines 221 attached hereto as Exhibit "C".)
Although the intent set forth in this passage is to give each of the parties one-half
of the value of the home and the retirement, the actual dollar amounts used by the trial
12

court do not accomplish this. The trial court declares that "each would be entitled to
$50,750.00" and his/her half share of the value of the home. It then awarded petitioner
the entire value of the home, $101,500.00, but only awards respondent $50,750.00 of the
retirement before dividing the remainder, thereby shorting respondent $50,750.00. Chart
"A" below shows the division as ordered by the trial court and Chart "B" below
demonstrates how respondent believes the trial court intended the division outcome.
CHART"A"
Petitioner

Respondent

$101,500.00 (home)
one-half balance of retirement

First $50,750.00 (retirement)
one-half balance of retirement

$101,500.00, Total plus one-half balance
of retirement

$50,750.00, Total, plus one-half
balance of retirement

CHART "B r
Petitioner

Respondent

$101,500.00 (home)
one-half balance of retirement

First $101,500,00 (retirement)
one-half balance of retirement

$101,500.00, Total, plus one-half balance
of retirement

$101,500.00, Total, plus one-half
balance of retirement

As can be seen in Chart "A", petitioner's total is $50,750.00 more than
respondent's total. Chart "B" has each receiving the same total value of these assets as
the trial court's language indicated it was intending to accomplish. (Respondent is
awarded an additional $9,500.00 off the topfromhis retirement to offset petitioner's onehalf of the 401-K loan marital debt that respondent is required to pay in full).
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In the alternative, if the division of the value of the home and retirement as set
forth in the Decree was not a calculation enor, then the trial court abused its discretion by
unequally dividing these assets. No exceptional circumstances for an unequal
distribution were argued by the petitioner, none were found by the trial court and
respondent believes that none existed. Here, as in Hall (ibid), "such an unequal
distribution of the parties' marital property makes no sense in the absence of findings
justifying the decision." Therefore, the trial court's unequal division of the home and
retirement should be remanded to correct the calculation error or correct its abuse of
discretion and award respondent the first $101,500.00 of retirement as an offset against
petitioner's receipt of the full $101,500.00 of the marital home.
The assets of petitioner's business are also unequally divided; all of it being
awarded to petitioner. The trial court found that the parties believed that the assets of this
business were worth between $4,558.00 and $9,340.00 (See Exhibit "A" Finding of Fact,
paragraph 7). Despite the testimony of the parties, the trial court found that the "business
is not worth either of the two values" and relied upon the 2000 and 2001 tax returns to
find that the business is a "losing venture and the losses exceed value." (See Exhibit "A"
Finding of Fact, paragraph 7). The trial court also found that the business checking
account had $7,234.00 one week prior to the trial date which it awarded to petitioner
because she needed this large accumulation of cash to pay ongoing business expenses.
(See Exhibit "A" Finding of Fact, paragraph 9(d)).
The evidence and testimony at trial establish that, as of the date of trial the only
business debt then existing was a credit card expense to pay for a tanning bed, and
14

supplies that come in and go out. (See Trial Transcript, page 85, line 25 through page 86,
lines 1 through 5, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"). The trial court had already provided
for the credit card/tanning bed debt in Finding of Fact paragraph 9(b) where it awarded
petitioner the $11,000.00 in her savings account, $4,500.00 of which was to take care of
this debt.
Because the business had no other, unaccounted for debt, there was nothing to
offset against the value of the business assets. Therefore, the value that the parties placed
on the assets, as well as the cash in the savings account had actual, unencumbered value
that the trial court should not have discounted. Its reference to the year 2000 and 2001
tax return losses as an offset against current value is both improper accounting procedure
because there was not current debt owing therefrom, and an abuse of discretion. The trial
court recognized that it should have ordered the business assets liquidated, but chose not
to because it was a source of income to petitioner (See Exhibit "A" Finding of Fact,
paragraph 7). The trial court's findings about the business assets are inconsistent and
apply the financial facts regarding petitioner's business inappropriately. The business
assets have actual, unencumbered value that should have been divided equally between
the parties rather than deciding that they had no value and awarding them exclusively to
petitioner.
B. Award of Alimony Beyond Respondent's Ability to Pay.
"In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount a trial court
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide;...". Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306
15

(Utah App. 1999). "Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion
resulting in reversal unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, incontroverted, and
capable of supporting only a finding in favor or the judgment." Rehn, (ibid) citing
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) and Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875
P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994).
In the present case, the trial court made proper findings with respect to the first
two required factors set forth in Rehn (need and earning capacity of recipient spouse at
findings of fact paragraphs 24 and 25), but failed to establish that respondent had the
ability to pay support. In its Findings of Fact, paragraph 26, the Trial Court made
findings that:
"The second unreasonable expense is $618.00 per month 401-K loan
payment which is clearly excessive. At that rate of payment, the loan
would be paid off in a very short period of time. Extrapolating the
respondent's analysis and suggestion of how petitioner could borrow funds
to pay respondent's claimed equity from the home, the Court believes
$120.00 per month payment is more reasonable payment and is in line with
respondent's suggested analysis. There is also a clear question in the
Court's mind as to the real monthly payment owed on the 401-K loan as the
documents presented by the respondent suggest several figures.
Consequently, the Courtfindsthat the $120.00 payment on the 401-K loan
is a reasonable sum. The respondent is ordered to assume and hold the
petitioner harmlessfromthe 401-K loan." (See Exhibit "A", Finding of
Fact, paragraph 26).
The trial court abused its discretion when it made these findings because there was
neither testimony nor other evidence admitted at trial to support them. The facts
presented at trial were as follows:
a. The 401 -K loan was a marital debt (See Exhibit "A", Findings of Fact
paragraph 9(a)).
16

b. Respondent testified that the 401-K monthly loan payment was $618.00
per month. (See Trial Exhibit "18" attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and Trial Transcript
page 138, lines 21 through 25 and page 139, lines 1 through 5 attached hereto as Exhibit
"F').
c. When respondent was asked by petitioner's attorney if he could readjust
the monthly payment of this loan, he responded by saying "no". (See Trial Transcript
page 139, lines 10 through 11 attached hereto as Exhibit "F').
d. When the trial judge asked respondent if he could borrow money from
another source and pay off the 401-K loan, respondent answered "no, I could not". (See
Trial Transcript page 140, lines 17 through 18 attached hereto as Exhibit "G").
e. Trial Exhibit No. 28 shows that the interest on the 401-K loan is $525.00
per month. (See page 2 of Trial Exhibit No. 28 attached hereto as Exhibit "H").
Nothing in the testimony or evidence presented supports a finding that the loan
payment is clearly excessive or that it can be reduced or refinanced to a lower amount,
and particularly not to $120.00 per month. In fact, the trial court was so concerned with
respondent's financial condition due to all of the debt respondent was ordered to pay that
it refers to respondent's potential for bankruptcy and refers to making the trial court's
orders "bankruptcy proof. (See Exhibit "A", Findings of Fact paragraph 22).
The trial court's actual language on this issue was as follows:
"In addition, the 401-K loan payment of $618 a month is clearly
excessive. It will pay off the loan in a very short period of time. The
respondent's Counsel opined that the petitioner could go out and get a
refinance of his - of the respondent's $50,000 share of the loan - of the
value in the home at about $300 a month or less.
17

Based on that opinion, extrapolating out the $19,000 loan, the
petitioner ought - the respondent ought to be able to get this $19,000
refinanced at roughly $120 a month or something like that. Now, I don't
know whether he can actually do it or not, but that's what they propose, and
I think $120 a month to pay off that is far more reasonable than the $618 a
month.
There also is a clear question in the Court's mind of whether or not
the payment is $308 per month. When I look at that last document that was
introduced, I think its $308 a month. However, I know that the respondent
- and I respect your difference. He claims it's the higher amount.
In any case, he's ordered to work some - either go get a loan from
somebody else and pay that $19,000 off, or to work something out with his
own 401-K. He can do it whichever way he feels like, but it's to be
refinanced and he's to reduce that amount.
Consequently, if we do that, I use the column that he has labeled
"after the fifth wheel sold" column on his Exhibit 18 - now, that includes
$400 a month he's paying towards these credit card debts, and I'm
awarding him all the credit card debt that he said that he would be willing
to pay that were his. That means we take off the $743 truck payment we
take the $618 401-K payment. We add to it the $120 a month 401-K
refinance payment, and the $150 a month home equity payment. His
expenses then become $2,911.
When I deduct $2,911 from $3,631, which is his income after taxes,
the amount that he can pay towards alimony is $720 a month. As I said, I
think here expenses were very reasonable, and I fiddled with hers. I'm
going to order him to pay the $720 a month as alimony in this particular
case." (See Trial Transcript page 216, lines 23 through page 218, line 9,
attached hereto as Exhibit "I").
The trial court cited the opinion that respondent's counsel made in closing
arguments about how petitioner could obtain a loan against the residence and
"extrapolated" that opinion to find that respondent "ought to be able to get this
$19,000.00 refinanced at roughly $120.00 per month or something like that". This use of
counsel's opinion during closing argument and extrapolation are in improper basis for
making findings and are not to be used in place of actual evidence. The actual evidence
at trial was that respondent was paying $618.00 per month on the 401-K loan, $525.00 of
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which was interest. The principal payment was, therefore, only $93.00 per month
($618.00 minus $525.00 equals $93.00). There is no reasonable way that the trial court
could have concluded that the loan balance of $19,000.00 could be paid off in a very
short period of time with this interest to principal payment ratio.
Neither party offered testimony that the loan could be paid off in a short period of
time or refinanced, and particularly not to such a low monthly payment. Respondent
testified twice in response to questions from petitioner's attorney and the trial judge that
he couldn't readjust the loan amount and couldn't borrow money from another source to
pay off this loan.
The trial court knew that respondent's 401-K loan obligation was $618.00 per
month, knew that respondent didn't believe he could reduce that amount, was concerned
that respondent was bankruptcy prone and had no idea how respondent could reduce the
loan payment to $120.00 per month. The trial court ignored these facts and just
eliminated $498.00 per month of respondent's debt associated with the 401-K loan
payment, thereby finding that respondent had an extra $498.00 of disposable income with
which to pay alimony. This was an abuse of discretion and respondent's alimony
obligation should be recalculated after subtracting from his net monthly income the
$498.00 of actual debt.
C. Award of Attorney Fees in Absence of Respondent's Ability to Pay.
"A trial court may award costs and attorney fees in divorce and modification
proceedings." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998). "However, the award or
denial of such fees must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving
19

spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees." Wilde v. Wilde, (ibid), citing Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991).
"Failure to consider these factors is grounds of reversal on the fee issue." Wilde v.
Wilde, (ibid), citing Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1996).
In the present case, the trial court at Findings of Fact no. 35 properly found that
petitioner had afinancialneed for her attorney fees to be paid. It made no reference to
the reasonableness of these fees. More importantly, the trial court made no reference to
respondent's ability to pay these fees other than to reference respondent's gross monthly
income. Respondent contends that the evidence presented at trial and the trial court's
prior award of alimony establishes that he did not have the ability to pay petitioner's
attorney fees.
The trial court found that respondent's net monthly income was $3,631.00 (see
Exhibit "A", Findings of Fact, paragraph 26). The trial court, after not allowing most of
two of respondent's expenses in the sum of $1,241.00 per month, because it found them
to be excessive and unreasonable (see Exhibit "A", Finding of Fact paragraph 26)
concluded that respondent's reasonable monthly living expenses equal $2,911.00 (see
Exhibit "A", Finding of Fact paragraph 28). The difference between the net monthly
income and reasonable monthly expenses is $720.00. This amount was awarded to
petitioner as alimony leaving respondent with no additional funds to pay attorney fees
and still having to come up with an additional $1,241.00 per month for the disallowed,
but actual monthly debt.
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Based upon the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
respondent to pay petitioner's attorney fees when it failed to make proper findings of fact.
In particular, the evidence and the trial court's other findings and other awards preclude a
finding that respondent had the ability to pay. The evidence establishes clearly that
respondent is without the ability to pay petitioner's attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court has either mistakenly or without finding exceptional
circumstances unequally divided the parties' marital property, the award made for the
home, retirement accounts and business assets must be reversed and remanded for
correction of error or additional findings supporting its conclusions.
Because the trial court improperly inflated respondent's net monthly income to
establish that he had an ability to pay a greater amount of alimony, the award of alimony
must be reversed and appropriate findings made to establish the correct amount of
respondent's income and an appropriate amount of alimony.
Finally, because the trial court failed to make any findings that respondent had the
ability to pay petitioner's attorney fees and because the evidence presented at trial made it
clear that respondent did not have the ability to pay those fees, the award of attorney fees
must be reversed.
DATED June 27, 2003.

/j

ft^

r

Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
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Douglas L. Neeley
"
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
1st South Main, Suite 205
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EXHIBIT "A"
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Petitioner
Is'South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SINDY HOLMSTEAD

:

Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 024600016

vs.

:

TONY D. HOLMSTEAD

:

Respondent.

:

JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 7th day of November, 2002,
before the Honorable Judge Paul D. Lyman. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his attorney, Howard Chuntz. The parties, having been sworn and having
testified in support of their pleadings, the Court having heard argument of counsel, and
being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes
and enters its:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Both Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide residents of Sevier County, State
of Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2. The marriage between the parties is long term, having been married on November
27, 1971, in the City of Bountiful, State of Utah.
3. The Respondent's extramarital affair and abusive behavior have caused difficulties
in the marriage that cannot be reconciled and have prevented the parties from pursuing a
viable marriage relationship.

The Petitioner should be granted a divorce form the

Respondent, effective today.
4. The Respondent should be permanently enjoined against and restrained from
bothering, calling, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the Petitioner at her
residence, business, or any other place. The Respondent should not be allowed to go to or
be upon the Petitioner's property or at her place of employment. Any appropriate peace
officer should be directed to render any necessary assistance to carry out the Restraining
Order here and above provided for. Further, violation of any of the provisions mentioned
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herein should be deemed contemptuous, and the violating party should be punished
accordingly.
5. The parties' children have all reached their majority or have otherwise become
emancipated.
6. The appraised value of the marital home was $103,500 which includes some, but
not all of, the reasonable and necessary repairs. The appraiser, Mr. Stott, deducted $3,500
for these repairs. Mr. Thomas, a licensed contractor, testified that there was indeed $5,448
in estimated repairs. The Court finds that an additional $2,000 should be deducted from the
appraised value of the home for these reasonable and necessary repairs, bringing the actual
value of the marital home to be $101,500.
7. The Syndicut has been the business of the Petitioner's during the marriage. It
appears to the Court that the Petitioner has given as low a value as possible and the
Respondent has given as high a value as possible to the assets of the business. The
Petitioner testified the value to be $4,558.50. The Respondent testified the value to be
$9,340. The Court finds that the business is not worth either of the two values. The 1999
tax returns shows a loss of $4,970 and the 2000 tax return shows a loss of $13,901. The
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business is clearly a losing venture and the losses clearly exceed any value. The business
should be liquidated. However, the Court is not going to order it to be sold because it is a
source of some income to the Petitioner and the Court awards the business to her with no
interest in the Respondent.
8. The Respondent testified that the Petitioner had cheated on her business expenses
when filing her income tax returns, yet he has asked the Court to postpone the actual divorce
date in order to allow the parties to file a joint tax return for 2002. If the Court believed the
Respondent, the Court would be allowing the Respondent to participate in a fraud.
However, the Court thinks it's a bunch of baloney and the Respondent should not want to
file a return with the Petitioner if he really thinks she's cheating. Because the Court is
granting the divorce as of today, the IRS code will not allow a joint return.
9. The Court wants to divorce these parties and make it so they have as little to do
with each other in regards to the marital assets as possible. For that reason, the Court has
lumped the Petitioner's savings account issue, the business checking account issue, and the
division of proceeds from the mountain property sale together and finds the following to be
a reasonable and fair division of those accounts:
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a. The parties borrowed from their daughters', Ashley and Kacy's, savings
accounts during the marriage to buy stock. Those debts have been repaid with funds from
the home equity loan. The Petitioner didn't like the purchase of stock with borrowed
money, but she went along with it anyway. The Court finds that the debt to buy stock from
the home equity loan is a marital debt.
b. The Petitioner has a savings account at Mtn. America Credit Union with
a balance of $11,000. The Court finds the Petitioner's testimony to be credible as to the
source of those funds; $4,500 was transferred from her business account to pay for a tanning
bed, $3,000 was deposited over the months for Kacy and which does belong to Kacy. The
remaining $3,500 came from the Petitioner's checking account. The Petitioner has now paid
Kacy her $3,000 from the account. The Petitioner has a credit card debt of $5,700 incurred
for the most part to purchase the tanning bed for $4,500. The remaining net to the Petitioner
from the savings account is $2,300 which should be awarded to her free and clear of any
interest in the Respondent.
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c. The parties sold some mountain property and the Respondent received
$11,000 from the sale proceeds and the Petitioner received $4,000, which shorts her $3,500
from an equitable split.
d. The Petitioner has a balance of $7,234 in her business account as of
October 31, 2002. In reviewing the checking account activity, the account balance truly
does fluctuate with a range in 2002 from a low of $1,616 in February to a high of $7,559 in
June. The Petitioner has testified that the account is used to pay ongoing business expenses
and supplies, to pay her quarterly income taxes, and to pay her FICA for her employees. The
Court finds her testimony credible and it seems to the Court that these are legitimate
business expenses and if she didn't accumulate the large balances, that she would have to
have a line-of-credit with a lending institution to meet these ongoing business expenses.
10. Based on the foregoing, the Court then awards the Respondent the $3,500
difference from the sale of the mountain property, but awards the Petitioner the $2,300 as
an off-set from the savings account. The Petitioner is awarded all the assets of the Syndicut
and business savings account balance. The Court specifically finds that such a division is
fair and reasonable and equitable.
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11. In regards to the parties' Winnebago, the Court accepts the Petitioner's testimony
that the vehicle has been sold for approximately the cost of the repairs. Consequently, the
Court finds that the value received against the cost of repairs is a wash and neither party
receives any value.
12. The Petitioner should be awarded her Sable vehicle with a value of $5,000. The
Respondent should be awarded his 1990 pickup truck and shell with a like value of $5,000.
13. In regards to the other personal property of the parties, neither party wanted
certain items, to-wit: two (2) large gray boxes with dishes, rifle scope and case, Ruger with
scope, air mattresses, chairs, sleeping bags, compound bow, hand-made fly rods, Ruger rifle,
33" deer mount, Savage shotgun combination, elk mount, deer mount (velvet), moose hide,
bear rug, dear mounted, antelope mount, Englewood pole, Coleman stove, knife collection,
4-wheeler trailer, 4-wheeler and plow, braided rug, one (1) burner stove, two (2) large
coolers, TeePee, Camp Chef, sheepherder stove, Coleman lantern, Ruger 1022, Ruger .06,
Remington 32 Special, and camping equipment. The Court orders that these items should
be sold now, no matter whose possession they are in and an accounting be provided to the
other party, including proof of the sales price and purchaser. The parties should split the
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sales proceeds evenly. If the Respondent wants any of the items, then he shall be obligated
to pay the Petitioner the value she has listed on her Exhibit No. 5 because the Court finds
her values to be more reasonable.
14. The Petitioner should be awarded all of the items of personal property on her
Exhibit No. 3, except the big screen TV and the entertainment center, which should be
awarded to the Respondent. The Respondent should be awarded the remaining items on
Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, except for those items listed above.
15. There has been testimony that a ruby diamond ring is missing. If it resurfaces,
it is to be sold and the proceeds split 50/50.
16. All remaining personal items should be awarded to the party that currently has
them in their possession.
17. The 5th wheel trailer should remain in the care of the Respondent and he is
responsible for all debt associated therewith. The Respondent should be ordered to sale the
trailer, retire the debt, and apply all net proceeds towards the home equity debt. The trailer
should be sold as soon as possible for as much as it can possibly bring.
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18. The Respondent should be awarded the new Ford diesel 4x4 pickup, together
with all debt associated therewith. The Court specifically finds that at best, the purchase was
foolish, but the Court is of the opinion that the Respondent incurred this debt for the
intentional purpose to gain an advantage in these divorce proceedings and lower his net
income available for alimony purposes. The truck should be sold immediately and all net
equity applied towards the home equity loan. If there is a deficiency after the sale, the
Respondent is solely responsible for the debt and he should hold the Petitioner harmless
therefrom.
19. After the Respondent has retired the debts from the 5th wheel trailer and the Ford
diesel truck, the parties are left with $19,000 on the home equity loan. The Court
specifically finds that this $19,000 debt is a marital obligation and should be equally shared
by the parties. The payment is $300 per month and each party is ordered to pay $150 per
month until the debt is paid in full. Either party can pay their share of $9,500 in advance,
but neither party is to use the home equity line of credit from here on.
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20. The Petitioner is awarded the home and real property with the only encumbrance
being the $19,000 home equity loan. The Respondent should quit claim his interest in the
home immediately to the Petitioner.
21. The Respondent should be awarded a larger portion of his 40 IK and receive his
portion of the home equity from those proceeds calculated as follows:
a. Each party has $50,750 of equity in the marital home after the $19,000
home equity loan is paid. The Respondent should receive the first $60,250 from his 40IK
and the remaining balance split 50/50 between the parties. Said sum is the Respondent's
portion of his equity in the marital home.
22. If for any reason, including bankruptcy, the Respondent fails to pay his portion
of the home equity loan, then the Petitioner is awarded that portion not paid from the
Respondent's 40IK and the Petitioner should be allowed to come back before the Court to
modify this provision and change the distribution of the 40 IK. This division and order is
meant to be bankruptcy proof. The Petitioner is awarded the home and all the equity and the
Respondent is awarded the larger portion of his 40 IK so long as he satisfies his portion of
the home equity loan.
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23. The Petitioner is awarded a portion of the Respondent's other retirement,
pension, or profit sharing plans from his place of employment and should be split pursuant
to the Woodward formula. The Respondent should prepare qualified domestic relation
orders consistent with these findings.
24. In regards to the parties' incomes, it is undisputed that the Petitioner earns $ 1,100
per month. The Petitioner has testified that she has $2,092 in monthly expenses and the
Respondent has suggested that some of the figures are inflated. However, it appears to the
Court that the Petitioner has in fact minimized her expenses on every account and the Court
specifically finds $2,092 to be reasonable monthly needs of the Petitioner. The Court has
further ordered her to pay $150 per month towards the home equity loan which she didn't
expect.
25. In order to help the Petitioner attain the same standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage, the Court finds that she needs at least $992 per month over and above
her income. It is unrefuted that during the marriage, money worries were non-existent for
the Petitioner. Since the separation, the Petitioner has been scrimping and saving in order
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to exist, which she shouldn't have to do. The Petitioner is in need of at least $992 to attain
the same standard of living.
26. The Respondent grosses $5,387 per month and after taxes, the Court finds his
net monthly income to be $3,631. The Respondent has listed monthly expenses, two (2) of
which the Court finds are clearly excessive and unreasonable. The first is the truck payment
of $743 per month. The Court has previously found that the Respondent incurred this
expense in order to avoid paying alimony. The second unreasonable expense is the $618 per
month 40IK loan payment which is clearly excessive. At that rate of payment, the loan
would be paid off in a very short period of time. Extrapolating the Respondent's analysis
and suggestion of how the Petitioner could borrow funds to pay the Respondent's claimed
equity from the home, the Court believes $120 per month payment is a more reasonable
payment and is in line with the Respondent's suggested analysis. There is also a clear
question in the Court's mind as to the real monthly payment owed on the 40IK loan as the
documents presented by the Respondent suggest several figures. Consequently, the Court
finds that the $120 payment on the 40IK loan is a reasonable sum. The Respondent is
ordered to assume and hold the Petitioner harmless from the 40IK loan.
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27. The Respondent has incurred substantial credit card debt since the parties'
separation. The Respondent has suggested that he is responsible for that debt and the Court
does order that he should pay that debt and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
28. After the Respondent has sold the 5th wheel trailer and retired the debt, the Court
finds that the Respondent has reasonable and necessary monthly expenses of $2,911 which
includes the credit card payment.

The Court reaches said sum using the following

calculations: $4,002 less $743 auto payment, less $498 401K loan payment, and less $150
home equity loan payment. These expenses are taken from the Respondent's Exhibit No.
18 under the heading after 5th wheel sold. Subtracting the reasonable expenses from the
Respondent's take home pay leaves $720 that he can pay towards alimony for the Petitioner
to help her monthly needs.
29. From the foregoing, the Court finds that $720 per month for alimony is a
reasonable amount which should be paid each month for the length of the marriage unless
terminated earlier by remarriage or cohabitation. The Respondent should pay 2/3's of this
amount immediately, which represents the balance owed for the remainder of this month.
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30. The parties also have accumulated an interest in some mountain real property.
The same should be sold immediately and the proceeds split equally between the parties.
31. The sales of the truck and 5th wheel trailer should be subject to review by the
Petitioner as well as the sales of the other personal property by either party. The sales should
be fair and reasonable and arm length transactions.
32. The Petitioner has income of $1,100 per month compared to the Respondent's
$5,300 per month. Clearly, the Petitioner does not have the ability to pay all of her
attorney's fees and costs.

The Petitioner should be awarded judgment against the

Respondent in the sum of $3,500 to help pay her attorney's fees. This sum takes into
account the $1,500 she has already paid against the $4,500 owed. Said judgment should
accrue interest at the statutory rate until paid in full.
33. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents
as are required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
34. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued
herein, that party should be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees
and Court costs incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matter, and the
parties are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, to become absolute and final
the date of hearing in this matter.
3. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute have been resolved by the
Court pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.

EXHIBIT "B"
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290
Attorney for Petitioner
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435)835-5055
Facsimile: (435)835-5057
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SINDYHOLMSTEAD
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,

:
Civil No. 024600016

vs.

;

TONY D. HOLMSTEAD

:

Respondent.

:

JUDGE PAUL D. LYMAN

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 7th day of November, 2002,
before the Honorable Judge Paul D. Lyman. Petitioner appeared in person and was
represented by her attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. Respondent appeared in person and was
represented by his attorney, Howard Chuntz. The parties, having been sworn and having
testified in support of their pleadings, the Court having heard argument of counsel, and
being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,

..
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT
1 The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing by and
' " •

: •.

-.: > ^ -* • Respondent i c. LL\U he r im? .ire hereby dissolved, and the

Petitioner is here1

. ...

.

,

. _,_

:C;,,

said Decree to become

absolute and final, effective the date of hearing in this matter.
2. The Respondent is permanently enjoined against and restrained from bothering,
calling, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the Petitioner at her residence, business,
-e upon the Petitioner's
property or at her place of employment. Any appropriate pea a™ officer i, dira lu.l in render
any necessary assistance to carry out the Restraining Order here and above provided for.
Further, violation of any of the provisions mentioned herein will be deemed contemptuous,
and fht \ lolatint7 parh \\ ill In iriuni Jied • uuudiniulv.
3. The parties are ordered to file separate tax returns for the ?00? la* wnr
4. The Respondent is awarded the $3,500 difference from the sale of the mountain
property, but awards the Petitioner the $2,300 as an off-set from the savings account. The
Petitioner is av irdcd all the assets of the Sjndicut and business savings account balance
with no interest in the Respondent.
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5. The Petitioner is awarded her Sable vehicle and the Respondent is awarded his
1990 pickup truck and shell.
6. In regards to me other pergonal property of the parties, neither party wanted certain
items, to-wit: two (2) large gray boxes with dishes, rifle scope and case, Ruger with scope,
air mattresses, chairs, sleeping bags, compound bow, hand-made fly rods, Ruger rifle, 33"
deer mount, Savage shotgun combination, elk mount, deer mount (velvet), moose hide, bear
rug, deer mounted, antelope mount, braided rug, Englewood pole, Coleman stove, knife
collection, 4-wheeler trailer, 4-wheeler and plow, one (1) burner stove, two (2) large coolers,
TeePee, Camp Chef, sheepherder stove, Coleman lantern, Ruger 243, Ruger 1022, Ruger
.06, Remington 32 special, and camping equipment. The Court orders that these items are
to be sold now, no matter whose possession they are in and an accounting be provided to the
other party, including proof of the sales price and purchaser. The parties are ordered to split
the sales proceeds evenly. If the Respondent wants any of the items, then he is obligated to
pay the Petitioner the value she has listed on her Exhibit No. 5.
7. The Petitioner is awarded all of the items of personal property on her Exhibit No.
3, except the big screen TV and the entertainment center, which are awarded to the
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Respondent. The Respondent is awarded the remaining items on Petitioned •; F-Mhibit :\u.
5, except for those items listed above.
• 8. 11" tin i * n 11 n cJ urn on d ring resurfaces, it is to be sold and the proceeds split 50/50.
9. All remaining personal inputs in; warded io die party that currently has them in
their possession.
10. I I ic 5th wheel trailer is to remain in the care of the Respondent and he is
responsible for .ill debt associated therewith. The Respondent is ordered to sale the trailer,
retire the debt, and apply all net proceed > u >\i. m
. d . tin: home equity debt. The trailer is to be
sold as soon as possible for as much as it can possibly bring.
The Respondent is awarded the new Ford diesel 4x4 pickup, together with all
;- r a ^

/

.*.^ith, The truck is to be sold immediately and all net equity applied

towards the home ec "y loan I f there is a deficient) a ftei the sale, the Respondent is solely
responsible for the debt and he is ordered to hold the Petitioner h.irmless iherefioni
After the Respondent has retired the debts from the 5th wheel trailer and the Ford
Hicsel tnii L die p.u tici* are It; i'i v\ H h "> I lHh)0 on the home equity loan which debt is a marital
obligation and v unl^ni i i He equally shaiui by the parties. I he payment is $300 per
month and each party is ordered to pay $150 per month w * : " \

a

^ • -* . e r. ;a

Either

Holmstead v Holmstead
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party can pay their share of $9,500 in advance, but neither party is to use the home equity
line of credit from here on.
13. The Petitioner is awarded the home and real property with the only encumbrance
being the $195000 home equity loan. The Respondent is ordered to quit claim his interest
in the home immediately to the Petitioner,
14. The Respondent is awarded a larger portion of his 401K and receive his portion
of the home equity from those proceeds calculated as follows:
a. Each party has $50,750 of equity in the marital home after the $19,000
home equity loan is paid. The Respondent is to receive the first $60,250 from his 40IK and
the remaining balance split 50/50 between the parties. Said sum is the Respondent's portion
of his equity in the marital home.
15. If for any reason, including bankruptcy, the Respondent fails to pay his portion
of the home equity loan, then the Petitioner is awarded that portion not paid from the
Respondent's 401K and the Petitioner will be allowed to come back before the Court to
modify this provision and change the distribution of the 40 IK. This division and order is
mjant to be bankruptcy proof. The Petitioner is awarded the home and all the equity and the

Holmstead v Holmstcad
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Respondent is awarded the larger ponion oflii:> 4i)"i K o Inny db he satisfies hit, ponion of
the home equity loan.
16. The Petitioner is awarded a portion of the Respondent's other retirement,
ptTT.iioi. or p

haring plans from his place of employment and is to be split pursuant to

the Woodwax* -•*

f:?

, --/.'

\,

„;.,; ^ u ^ . ; , a domestic relation

orders consistent with the findings entered herein.
1n

The Respondent is ordered to assume and hold the Petitioner harmless from the

IK Tht; Rr puntlcn' i< mcla'al \o yuw \\\\ uetiii uud debt and hold the Petitioner
harmless therefrom.
1 ^ The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner a sum of $720 per month for
al : .; . - : v\. .. v cc paid each month for the length of the marriage unless terminated
earh -r •• r*

•

MiabiUtioi' 1 he Respondent r ordcitd lo pa\ 2 3'V of this amount

immediately, which represents the balance owed for the remainder of this month.
20. The parties also have accumulated an interest in some mountain real property.
The same is to be sold immediately and the proceeds split equally between the parties.

Holmstead v Holmstead
Decree of Divorce
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21. The sales of the truck and 5th wheel trailer is subject to review by the Petitioner
as well as the sales of the other personal property by either party. The sales are to be fair and
reasonable and arm length transactions.
22. The Petitioner is awarded judgment against the Respondent in the sum of $3,500
to help pay her attorney's fees. Said judgment will accrue interest at the statutory rate until
paid in full.
23. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
24. Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued
herein, that party will be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and
Court costs incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this h ^

day of January, 200^

JUDGE PAUL D/L
District Court Judge

EXHIBIT "C"
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that proceeds is paid towards the home equity loan, all right?

2

Now, the house and the 401-K are going to be combined

3

for purposes of getting you two ultimately divorced.

4

loan amount is going to be divided as well.

5

house is awarded to the petitioner, okay, and the 401-K account

6

is going to be divided, and I'm going to go through how.

7

I'm finding that the $19,000 debt —

8

on the 401-K account —

9

consequently owed $9,500 of the $19,000.

The 401-K

First of all, the

that's the loan

was a marital obligation.

Each one

The respondent will

10

receive his portion of the house's equity by taking a larger

11

portion of the 401-K asset.

12

The equity in the house, it —

and this is where it

13

gets complicated.

14

there is no obligation on this house, and both parties co-own

15

it 50/50.

16

Once the home equity loan is paid, then

Then each would be entitled to $50,750.
The respondent is awarded the first $50,750 of his

17

401-K.

In addition to that, he's awarded 9,500 more dollars,

18

which is the petitioner's portion of the debt that was borrowed

19

from the 401-K.

20

money.

21

as of today.

So he would get the first $60,250 of the 401-K

The balance is split 50/50, and the computation is done

22

If the respondent fails to pay his portion of the

23

equity loan for any reason, including bankruptcy, then the

24

petitioner is awarded whatever portion he has failed to pay

25

from the 401-K.

EXHIBIT "D
IK:

KANSCRIPT, PAGE 85

-851

really getting into, Mr. Chuntz, is argument.

2

documents.

3

second year.

4

where I think you're headed with it, and you know, the claim is

5

that it's just bogus, okay?

6

going to admit it.

7

to deny it.

8
9

Q.

I can see the

There's no evidence she made any payments the
You've asked that two or three times.

So

But that's argument.

I see

She's never

She's just going to stay here and continue

—

BY MR. CHUNTZ: When asked by your Counsel how much

money total you took out of the business in the form of cash or

10

in the form of payments of personal expenses by credit card, I

11

think your testimony was $1,000 to $1,100 a month.

12

A.

13
14

Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Do you want to offer this as an exhibit,

your state —

the account paid?

15

MR. CHUNTZ: Yes.

16

THE COURT: Why don't we do it.

17

MR. CHUNTZ: Move to admit Exhibit 11.

18

THE COURT: Do you have any objection, Mr. Neeley?

19

MR. NEELEY: No.

20

THE COURT: It's admitted.

21

(Exhibit No. 11 received into evidence)

22
23

Q.

BY MR. CHUNTZ: During —

you also indicated that your

business, at least on paper, loses money every year.

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Do you owe any money on the business right now?

EXfflBIT "E"
TRIAL EXfflBFI

IS
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Howard Chuntz, No. 4208
Attorney for Respondent
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SINDY HOLMSTEAD,
AFFIDAVIT OF MONTHLY
EXPENSES

Petitioner,
v.
TONY D. HOLMSTEAD,

Civil No. 024600016
Judge Paul D. Lyman

Respondent.
/

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
I, Tony D. Holmstead, upon oath duly sworn, state that my ongoing monthly expenses are
as follows:

Rent/mortgage
Utilities
Telephone
Maintenance
Food and household
Clothing
Heath insurance
Incidentals (gifts,

Currently

After Home
Sold or
Refinanced

$ 138.00
$ 75.00
$ 25.00
$ 350.00
$ 100.00
$ 60.00

$
$
$
$
$
$

138.00
75.00
25.00
350.00
100.00
60.00

After 5th
Wheel Sold

After 40IK
Loan Split

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

800.00
138.00
75.00
25.00
350.00
100.00
60.00

800.00
138.00
75.00
25.00
350.00
100.00
60.00

internet, hair care)
Entertainment
Auto Expense (gas,
oil, repairs, ins.)
Life insurance
Union dues
Auto Payment
Installment Debt
Medical
Dental
401K loan (for preseparation stock
purchase)
Home Equity
Other (5th wheel
payment and ins.)
Total
DATED this

$ 100.00
$ 150.00

$ 100.00
$ 150.00

$ 100.00
$ 15000

$ 100.00
$ 150.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

200.00
13.00
68.00
743.00
400.00
137.00
25.00

200.00
13.00
68.00
743.00
400.00
137.00
25.00

$ 618.00
$ 300.00

$618 Off

$ 494.00

$ 494.00

$3,996.00

$3,696.00

200.00
13.00
68.00
743.00
400.00
137.00
25.00

200.00
13.00
68.00
743.00
400.00
137.00
25.00

$01800

$ 309.00

$4,002.00

$3,693.00
•N

day of November, 2002.
\

^

<a

Tony D. Holmsjcead, Respondent
Subscribed and sworn to before me this s

day of November, 2002.

u
Notary Public

EXHIBIT "F"
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, PAGES 138-139

-138He gets nailed wi_th penalties.

trea ted as a withdrawal

MR. NEELEY . Okay.
THE COURT: How can he
from the 401--K

— would he just b orrow again

—

MR. NEELEY

No, he could pay

THE COURT: —

—

or would he just cas hed in part o f his

401- K, incur all of his penalties to pay it off; is that what
you' re arguing?
MR. NEELEY: No, I'm just asking

I don't know.

THE COURT: Because that's the way 401-K' s work.
They're all available at the same —

to get the tax benefit,

if he takes the money out of the 401-K to pay a loan to a
401-K, he pays the penalties.

I think that's just the law.

MR. CHUNTZ: That's our position, too.
THE COURT: Yeah, and so if

—

MR. NEELEY: It's a 10 percent penalty on both loans,
plus the income.
THE COURT: Plus the taxes for that year.
on as if it were the last dollar.

They tack it

So it could be huge.

THE WITNESS: Over 25 percent.
Q.

BY MR. NEELEY: What's the balance on the loan?

A.

From the 401-K loan?

Q.

Yes, the 401-K.
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

Q.

BY MR. NEELEY: How much is that?

-139A.

$19,000.

Q.

And you pay $7f000 a year?

A.

Well, if you've done the math.

Q.

If you pay $618 you say you're paying on that.

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

So that will be paid off in three years.

A.

I guess so.

Q.

Well, what is the due date on the loan?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Can you readjust the monthly payment amount?

A.

No.

I mean, is that right?

I don't have a calculator in front of me.

Not unless I get another loan, and they have

stipulations there on what kind of loans you can get based on
what your previous loans were.

I mean, this is a —

you know,

they just don't let you mix and match and mess around with this
thing.
Q.

Okay.

A.

It's set.

I mean, that's just the way it is.

I mean,

it's basically untouchable, unless you feel like you could pay
a huge p enalty on it.
Q.

Well, if this is the amount you're paying, that's you

! know, over $7,000 a year.
A.

Okay.

Q.

If you had 19, owed 3 more years, that's 21.

assuming this includes principal?
A.

It does.

I'm

EXHIBIT "G'
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, PAGE 140

-1401
2

MR. CHUNTZ: Argumentative, your Honor.
amount of interest there is on it.

3
4

He can't

(Inaudible)

—

MR. NEELEY: Well, I just asked him if this includes
principal, and the answer is he said it did.

5

MR. CHUNTZ: Okay.

6

Q.

BY MR. NEELEY: (Inaudible), right?

7

A.

As far as I know, yes.

It has an interest rate on it.

8

It's got a calculation on how much money I take a month and

9

when it will be due.

10

Q.

There's no payoff pre-payment penalty if you went out

11

and got a more conventional loan for $90,000.

12

that loan off at the 401-K; could you not?

13

A.

14

You could pay

Why would I want to do that?
THE COURT: No, no.

The answer is "yes" or "no."

15

Don't say why you don't want to do that, because I see a lot

16

of good reasons why I ought to order you to do that, okay?

17

maybe you ought just answer n yes" or n no."

18

that from another source and pay that 401-K loan off?

19

Could you go borrow

THE WITNESS: No, I could not.

20

Q.

21

loan, $300.

22

So

A.

BY MR. NEELEY: Now, the next one is the home equity
You're paying that?

Yes, it's coming —

it comes right directly out of my

23

checking account, the Wells Fargo, to pay my Wells Fargo home

24

equity loan.

25

Q.

Is that the total payment of the home equity line, or

EXHIBIT "H"
TRIAL EXHIBIT "28", RETIREMENT ACCOUNT STATEMENT

# PACIFICORP

K Plus Plan
Account Statement
Employee ID: 0000010085
Employment Status: Active

004704

TONY D. HOLMSTEAD
710 N MAIN
RICHFIELD UT 84701

Here is a summary of your PacifiCorp K Plus Plan account as of September 30, 2002.

Personal Information
Birth Date
Original Hire Date

04-04-1952
05-08-1978

Contribution Rate
Pre-tax

K Plus Plan Elected Rate

6%

Contributions
Your Post-tax Contributions
Your Pre-tax Contributions

$12.90
$48,799.56

Investment Elections
Fulul

Aggressive Equity
LifePath 2040
Total

delivered by

Hewitt

Percents

50%
50%
100%

Account Statement

Page 2

Outstanding Loans
Plan
K Plus Plan Loan 1

Effective
Date

Outstanding
Balance

Scheduled
Repayment

09-18-2000

$19,241.26

$308.49

$19,241.26

$308.49

Total

Activity From July 01, 2002 through September 30, 2002

Opening Balance
Contributions
Pre-tax
Company Match
Investment Results
Dividend
Earnings
Loan Payment Interest
Loan Payment Principal
Withdrawals/Distributions
Closing Balance
Closing Units
Price

Equivalent Shares
Stock Price

ScottishPower
ADSESOP

Aggressive Equity

LifePath 2040

Loan Fund

$9,126.83

$30,932.64

$50,062.53

$20,566.78

0.00
0.00

485.55
375.85

485.52
375.84

0.00
0.00

190.11
143.99
0.00
0.00
-190.11
$9,270.82
1444.779963
6.416769
426.244598
21.750000

0.00
-4,700.48
262.73
662.77
0.00
$28,019.06
2078.565081
13.480000

143.23
-8,210.10
262.69
662.75
0.00
$43,782.46
3843.939111
11.390000

0.00
0.00
0.00
-1325.52
0.00
$19,241.26

Account Statement

Page 3

Total

$110,688.78

Opening Balance
Contributions
Pre-tax
Company Match
Investment Results
Dividend
Earnings
Loan Payment Interest
Loan Payment Principal
Withdrawals/Distributions
Closing Balance

971.07
751.69
333.34
-12,766.59
525.42
0.00
-190.11
$100,313.60

Closing Balance By Account (Excludes Loan Fund)
[

Pre-tax
Prior Co Match
Post-tax
Company Match
Total

"_

TOTAL

$44,671.25
$25,891.34
$155.00
$10,354.75
$81,07234

As of September 30, 2002 you were 100% vested in the company matching account. Your vested account
balance was $81,072.34.

For More Information
If you need additional information, access the Your Benefits Resources™ Web site at
http://resources.hewitt.com/pacificorp or call the PacifiCorp K PlusLine toll-free at 1-800-241-7587
at any time. PacifiCorp Benefits Center representatives are available between 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.,
Pacific time, Monday through Friday.

Your Benefits Resources™ is a trademark of Hewitt Associates LLC.
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because they reflect food that she bought and things like that.

2

In addition to that I've also ordered her to pay off

3

her credit card debt so she's debt free, which would further

4

reduce that $320 item, but I've ordered her to pay $150 on the

5

home equity loan, which she didn't expect to have to pay off,

6

in order to —

7

of living that she enjoyed during the course of the marriage,

8

which was described and is unrefuted as she didn't have to

9

worry about money at all, I find that the $2,092 that she's

now, in order to help her attain the standard

10

claimed is reasonable, even though I'm doing the fiddling with

11

the installment account portion of her expenses.

12

I still think it's reasonable.

13

and saving.

14

scrimp and save.

15

to what she had enjoyed.

16

That was the testimony.

She's been scrimping

She shouldn't have to

She should be able to enjoy a similar style
That leaves her shortfall at $992.

His income is undisputed.

The gross income is $5,387

17

a month.

18

dispute with regard to that.

Two of the expenses of the

19

respondent are unreasonable.

First, the truck payment will not

20

be counted.

21

attempt to have him not have to pay alimony.

22

to be sold immediately and I won't count it as an expense.

23

After taxes it's $3,631, and there was no real

Its purpose, the Court has already found, was to
Consequently it's

In addition, the 401-K loan payment of $618 a month is

24

clearly excessive.

25

period of time.

It will pay off the loan in a very short

The respondent's Counsel opined that the

-217petitioner could go out and get a refinance of his —
respondent's $50,000 share of the loan —

of the

of the value in the

home at about $300 a month or less.
Based on that opinion, extrapolating out the $19,000
loan, the petitioner ought —

the respondent ought to be able

to get this $19,000 refinanced at roughly $120 a month or
something like that.

Now, I don't know whether he can actually

do it or not, but that's what they propose, and I think $120 a
month to pay off that is far more reasonable than the $618 a
month.
There also is a clear question in the Court's mind of
whether or not the payment is $308 per month.

When I look at

that last document that was introduced, I think it's $308 a
month.

However, I know that the respondent —

your difference.

and I respect

He claims it's the higher amount.

In any case, he's ordered to work some —

either go

get a loan from somebody else and pay that $19,000 off, or to
work something out with his own 401-K.

He can do it whichever

way he feels like, but it's to be refinanced and he's to reduce
that amount.
Consequently, if we do that, and I use the column
that he has labeled "after the fifth wheel sold" column on
-his Exhibit 18 —

now, that includes $400 a month he's paying

towards these credit card debts, and I'm awarding him all the
credit card debt that he said that he would be willing to pay

-218that were his.

That means we take off the $743 truck payment,

we take the $618 401-K payment.

We add to it the $120 a month

401-K refinance payment, and the $150 a month home equity
payment.

His expenses then become $2,911.
When I deduct $2,911 from $3,631, which is his income

after taxes, the amount that he can pay towards alimony is $72 0
a month.

As I said, I think her expenses were very reasonable,

and I fiddled with hers.

I'm going to order him to pay the

$720 a month as alimony in this particular case.
The petitioner earns $1,100 a month gross.
respondent earns $5,387.

The

Clearly in my mind she has very

little ability to pay a $3,500 attorney's fee.

I am awarding

the petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $3,500.
The $1,500 she already paid, we've taken that into account,
but the $3,500 I'm awarding.
I think I've covered everything according to my notes.
Mr. Neeley, are there anything

—

MR. NEELEY: One more thing.

I think we stipulated,

your .Honor, that the mountain property should be sold
immediately and the proceeds split.
THE COURT: Yes, that was part of —
of the initial stipulations.
here.

that was one

That's why I didn't bring it up

Anything else you want me to make findings on?

Anything

else you have questions about?
MR. NEELEY: Just so I make sure.

You specifically

